Humans regularly pursue activities characterized by dramatic success or failure outcomes where, critically, the chances of success depend on the time invested working toward it. How should people allocate time between such make‐or‐break challenges and safe alternatives, where rewards are more predictable (e.g., linear) functions of performance? We present a formal framework for studying time allocation between these two types of activities, and we explore optimal behavior in both one‐shot and dynamic versions of the problem. In the one‐shot version, we (...) illustrate striking discontinuities in the optimal time allocation policy as we gradually change the parameters of the decision‐making problem. In the dynamic version, we formulate the optimal strategy—defined by a giving‐up threshold—which adaptively dictates when people should stop pursuing the make‐or‐break goal. We then show that this strategy is computationally inaccessible for humans, and we explore boundedly rational alternatives. We compare the performance of the optimal model against (a) a myopic giving‐up threshold that is easier to compute, and even simpler heuristic strategies that either (b) only decide whether or not to start pursuing the goal and never give up or (c) consider giving up at a fixed number of control points. Comparing strategies across environments, we investigate the cost and behavioral implications of sidestepping the computational burden of full rationality. (shrink)

My main point is that the creation of a free public time implies the creation of a democratic collective inspired by the project of social ecology. The first and second parts of this article focus on the modern social phenomena correlated to the general crisis and the emergence of the Internet Age (Castells, 2012). The third and fourth parts focus on new significations that seem to inspire modern social movements and the challenges that modern democratic ecological collectivities face. I use (...) the term “social ecology” as defined by Murray Bookchin: “Social ecology is based on the conviction that nearly all of our present ecological problems originate in deep-seated social problems” (Bookchin, 2006, p. 19). And I use the term “democracy” exclusively in the original, true meaning, of direct democracy where society is self-governed by the equal participation of every individual to political decisions and functions, as opposed to a modern representative democracy or republic, where political decisions rest in the hands of an oligarchy. In this sense, a truly democratic political collectivity is a truly ecological collectivity and vice versa. (shrink)

Current corporate social responsibility approaches attempt to implement the vision of sustainable development at the corporate level. In fact, the term "corporate sustainability" may be a more accurate descriptive label for these attempts. Ambitious governmental, business and academic goals, and corresponding efforts have been established. Nonetheless, a truly satisfactory implementation of the broad CSR concept as well as the more specific challenges of corporate sustainability continue to be an elusive goal at the corporate management level. This article presents a description (...) of a new management tool, a systematic method for implementing CSR successfully on the basis of a triple bottom line approach to sustainability. It fills in many of the still missing gap on the corporate level. The method presented here offers a multi-purpose approach for the collection, systematization, quantification, and evaluation of all the relevant issues found within a corporate environment. It allows for specifying and systematizing appropriate areas of action, taking into account the continuum of economic, ecologic,1 and social dimensions. Accordingly, the article is best characterized as a treatment of complex CSR issues, developed against the normative anchor of sustainability as the conceptual background. (shrink)

This book constitutes a critical intervention in the theoretical discussion over the political relationship between democracy and communism. Shedding light on the philosophical origins of the democracy debate, it draws a clear demarcation line between liberalism and republicanism, arguing that after rejecting the former and supporting the latter, the young Marx endorsed 'true democracy' as a prelude to his forthcoming theory of communism. To this end, while following the dynamics of the Marxian history of political ideas and pre-communist theory of (...) the state, the book takes into account the thought of a vast range of philosophers and political theorists, starting from the Ancient times, passing through the Age of Enlightenment, the German Idealist tradition the Young Hegelians’ Republicanism, and reaching our own times. It will be of interest to students and scholars interested in the history of political thought, theories of democracy, and Marxism. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s view of philosophical explanation. Some commentators stress his indebtedness to the transcendental tradition, but this influence does not extend to his view of explanation. I argue that Merleau-Ponty gives up on the transcendental ideal of explanatory completeness, shared by Husserl and Kant. Motivated by a distinctive understanding of transcendental expression, he argues that phenomenological reflection, and the explanations that issue from it, must both have a circular structure if they are to provide a (...) persuasive account of experience. This circular view of phenomenological methodology is further developed in later texts, which stress the openness and incompleteness of both reflection and explanation. Merleau-Ponty’s reliance on the concept of circularity testifies to the increasing importance of Hegel for his view of phenomenological explanation and philosophical methodology. (shrink)

In this paper we secure the explanatory value of affordances by treating them as relational properties and as inherently linked to unintentional movements and possible intentional actions. We distinguish between Basic affordances, which are related to unintentional movements, and Complex affordances, which are subjective and executively controlled by individuals. The linkage between affordances and motor intentions allows for accounting for the infinite number of affordances that any given object potentially has. Appealing to objective systematic contingencies that provide the actor with (...) information about the effects of her actions, allows for accounting for perception of affordances and for securing their explanatory value. (shrink)

Michael and Niketas Choniates, significant figures of letters of the second half of the twelfth and the early thirteenth century, were closely related to the Belissariotai, a noble family of the Byzantine aristocracy. Thanks to both Choniatai brothers we are able to gather valuable information about the Belissariotai and to examine not only their role in the administration of the state during the last quarter of the twelfth century, but also their unbreakable bonds of friendship and kinship with the Choniatai. (...) This paper aims to present a thorough prosopographic study on the Belissariotai family through the examination of literary and sigillographic evidence and to challenge a series of long-established views regarding the different stages of their life and career. (shrink)

Nel 1956, in piena guerra fredda, una conferenza di scienziati al Dartmouth College negli Stati Uniti annunciò il lancio di un audace progetto scientifico, l’Intelligenza Artificiale (I.A.). Dopo l’iniziale fallimento degli sforzi della “Hard AI” di produrre un’intelligenza simile a quella umana, alla fine del XX secolo è emerso il movimento della “Soft AI”. Invece di essere orientato a imitare il comportamento umano in relazione a compiti specifici, ha preferito cercare modi alternativi di eseguire i compiti basati sulle particolari funzioni (...) e strutture della macchina. Il fattore decisivo è stata la combinazione della tecnologia di apprendimento automatico con le comunicazioni digitali online, l’incontro tra l’IA e Internet. Le applicazioni dell’IA “soft” sono quelle che vediamo nel mondo dei dispositivi automatici “intelligenti” che informano la nostra vita sociale digitale. Nel seguente articolo mi concentrerò su una particolare applicazione dell’IA per le discussioni online con utenti umani, ChatGPT, per mostrare le implicazioni della tecnologia digitale online nelle modalità storico-sociali dell’esistenza umana. ChatGPT è un’applicazione che combina l’IA con Internet, le possibilità della corrispondenza tra macchine e le potenzialità della tele-comunicazione umana. Il mio approccio si concentra sulle implicazioni fenomenologiche e storico-sociali della proliferazione della tecnologia AI per quanto riguarda la coscienza e la socialità umana. -/- Abstract (english) -/- In 1956, amidst the Cold War, a conference of scientists at Dartmouth College in the United States announced the launch of a bold, scientific project, Artificial Intelligence (A.I.). After the initial failure of “Hard AI” efforts to produce a human-like intelligence, the “Soft AI” movement emerged in the late 20th century. Instead of being oriented towards imitating human behaviour concerning specific tasks, it preferred to seek alternative ways of performing tasks based on the particular functions and structures of the machine. The decisive factor was the combination of Machine Learning technology with Digital Online Communications, the meeting between AI and the Internet. The applications of “Soft” AI are those we see in the world of “smart”, “intelligent” automatic devices that inform our digital social life. In the following article, I will focus on a particular application of AI for online discussions with human users, ChatGPT, in order to show the implications of online digital technology in the social-historical modalities of human existence. ChatGPT is an application that combines AI with the Internet, the possibilities of Machine correspondence with the potentialities of human telecommunications. My approach focuses on the phenomenological and social-historical implications of the proliferation of AI technology as regards human consciousness and sociality. (shrink)

This paper is a response to Enguehard (Natural Language Semantics 29(4):527–578, 2021 ), who observes that presuppositions project in the same way from coordinations of declaratives and coordinations of polar questions, but existing mechanisms of projection from declaratives (e.g. Schlenker in Theoretical Linguistics 34(3):157–212, 2008, Semantics and Pragmatics 2:1–78, 2009 ) fail to scale to questions. His solution involves specifying a trivalent inquisitive semantics for (coordinations of) questions that bakes the various asymmetries of presupposition projection into the lexical entry of (...) conjunction/disjunction. However, we argue that such a move faces both theoretical and empirical issues. Instead, we show that the data can be handled without moving to such an asymmetric inquisitive denotation, by adapting the novel pragmatic theory of _Limited Symmetry_ (Kalomoiros in Proceedings of the 52nd annual meeting of the North East linguistic society, GLSA, Amherst, 2022 ) to an inquisitive framework in a way that leaves the underlying semantics for conjunction symmetric and bivalent, while deriving the projection data. (shrink)

Scholarly discussions of Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetics tend to focus on his philosophy of painting. By contrast, comparatively little attention has been paid to his philosophy of literature. However, he also draws significant conclusions from his work on literary expression. As I will argue, these reflections inform at least two important positions of his later thought. First, Merleau-Ponty’s account of “indirect” literary language led him to develop a hybrid view of phenomenological expression, on which expression is both creative and descriptive. Second, a (...) study of literature furnished him with the resources to develop a novel account of phenomenological “essences”, which holds that essences are revisable explanations of first-order experience. Both results have been overlooked by commentators. They demonstrate the systematic import of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of literature and language, and amount to a qualified extension of a basic Husserlian position. (shrink)

I argue that Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego draws on Kant's theory of spontaneity to articulate its metaphysical account of consciousness's mode of being, to defend its phenomenological description of the intentional structure of self‐consciousness, and to diagnose the errors that motivate views of consciousness qua person or substance. In addition to highlighting an overlooked dimension of Sartre's early relation to Kant, this interpretation offers a fresh account of how Sartre's argument for the primacy of pre‐personal consciousness works, and brings (...) the extent of his proximity to idealist models of mind into greater relief. It also affords Sartre the resources to respond to criticisms that his account of self‐consciousness relies on a spurious distinction and that his view of freedom cannot explain how consciousness is conditioned by its world. (shrink)

Many philosophers claimed that there might be fertile ground for collaboration between IBE and the objective end of the Bayesian methodology. Recent literature is investigated in this chapter, to highlight the latest developments about the possibility of such a collaboration. The merits of the convergence of the two methods are presented. It is argued that arriving on this end is not an easy goal as there are four ways by which subjective considerations may overshadow the objective picture. The existence of (...) subjective virtues, the vagueness of the mapping, the absence of an accurate weighting, and the existence of partial virtues allow the generation of infinitely many different initializations of priors and likelihoods, thus keeping the explanationist away from the objective extreme. Hence, either the explanationist successfully faces up with each one of the four problems so as to converge to the objective end or she ends up in a semi-objective position, whereby the explanatory restrictions allow a bunch of equally good probability distributions. (shrink)

Interaction between drivers and pedestrians is often facilitated by informal communicative cues, like hand gestures, facial expressions, and eye contact. In the near future, however, when semi- and fully autonomous vehicles are introduced into the traffic system, drivers will gradually assume the role of mere passengers, who are casually engaged in non-driving-related activities and, therefore, unavailable to participate in traffic interaction. In this novel traffic environment, advanced communication interfaces will need to be developed that inform pedestrians of the current state (...) and future behavior of an autonomous vehicle, in order to maximize safety and efficiency for all road users. The aim of the present review is to provide a comprehensive account of empirical work in the field of external human–machine interfaces for autonomous vehicle-to- pedestrian communication. In the great majority of covered studies, participants clearly benefited from the presence of a communication interface when interacting with an autonomous vehicle. Nevertheless, standardized interface evaluation procedures and optimal interface specifications are still lacking. (shrink)

Setting out from the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, this article engages with post-Heideggerian thought on community, seeking to bring out and to enhance its political thrust for contemporary democracies. It shows how Jean-Luc Nancy, Roberto Esposito and Giorgio Agamben, ‘common the political’, that is, how they reconsider politics in light of a fundamental sense of co-existence which clears the ground for social openness, solidarity, plurality and autonomy. It then responds to a series of pertinent objections by further politicizing the post-Heideggerian (...) vision of the common. I set out to translate the ontologies of the common into more concrete political logics by relating them to actual political practices and by joining them to the political theory of hegemony and antagonism set out by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Their conjunction of the ‘common’ with the antagonistic politics of hegemony is tension-ridden, as they draw from conflicting understandings of ‘the political’, pitting plurality and horizontal relations against division and uneven power. To mitigate that conflict, these two approaches should be situated at different sites of political action, and the hegemonic framework should be recast so as to bring it more into line with horizontalist ‘common’ politics. (shrink)

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

Through accessible analyses of Merleau-Ponty’s views of linguistic expression and understanding, and by tracing the evolution of these views throughout the course of his philosophical career, Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Language offers a comprehensive picture of his engagement with the philosophy of language.

Η δυνατότητα αναθεώρησης των πεποιθήσεων ενός τυπικού ή μη γνώστη καθώς επίσης και η περιγραφή του πλαισίου στο οποίο αυτό συμβαίνει, είναι από τα σημαντικότερα προβλήματα που απασχολούν την σύγχρονη φιλοσοφική έρευνα. Στον γόνιμο διάλογο που έχει αναπτυχθεί τις τελευταίες δεκαετίες, ο Κουτούγκος συνεισφέρει με την περιγραφή του μοντέλου της μερικής συμφωνίας. Στην απλούστερη μορφή του αφορά την μονόδρομη επικοινωνία μεταξύ ενός ακροατή και ενός ομιλητή σχετικά με κάποιο δεδομένο για το οποίο δεν υπάρχει ταύτιση απόψεων. Βασικοί του στόχοι είναι (...) αφενός να διερευνηθούν οι παράγοντες που επηρεάζουν τη δυνατότητα η τελική γνώμη του ακροατή να συγκλινει προς την αντίστοιχη του ομιλητή και αφετέρου να περιγραφεί ένα ποσοτικό μοντέλο που θα που θα καθιστά την σύγκλιση μετρήσιμη. Προκειμένου να αναδειχθεί η φιλοσοφική συμβολή του, στην εισαγωγή σκιαγραφούμε τα δυο πιο διαδεδομένα μοντέλα αναθεώρησης πεποιθήσεων, το Μπεϋζιανό και το AGM. Στην συνέχεια περιγράφεται το φιλοσοφικό υπόβαθρο και τα τυπικά χαρακτηριστικά του μοντέλου μερικής συμφωνίας. Ακολουθεί η συνοπτική σύγκρισή του με το Μπεϋζιανό και το AGM και η κριτική αποτίμηση του στο πλαίσιο του ευρύτερου διαλόγου περί αναθεώρησης πεποιθήσεων. Τέλος, παρουσιάζονται τα συμεράσματα και σκιαγραφούνται οι νέες ερευνητικές κατευθύνσεις που φαίνεται να διανοίγει το παρών μοντέλο. -/- . (shrink)

abstract: I argue that Merleau-Ponty's reading of Hegel's account of experience exerts a significant and hitherto overlooked influence on his attempt to recast Phénoménologie de la perception 's account of intentionality. This reading informs two important claims of his later projects: that intentional relations are more fundamental than their relata, and that a metaphysical condition irreducible to consciousness or object constitutes the structure of intentionality. I argue that these positions inform key tenets of reversibility, and that a revisionary interpretation of (...) Hegel's absolute offers Merleau-Ponty a model for the principle that individuates the basic conditions of experience. In addition to demonstrating that he was a more assiduous reader of Hegel than many commentators assume, and highlighting some overlooked debts to Hegel, these results show that Merleau-Ponty's later thought inherits significant idealist commitments, which should motivate us to reconsider its standing within post-Kantian philosophical currents. (shrink)

La structure du comportement details consciousness-nature relations by navigating between realist and intellectualist alternatives. A phenomenological reading of form guides its attempt to formulate a view that does not reduce consciousness to matter or perceptual structure to a product of mind. I show that this strategy relies on hitherto overlooked idealist commitments. Forms are perceived objects whose intentional structure is intelligibly organized. Having denied that forms are constituted by mind or emergent from matter, Merleau-Ponty likens form-constitution to an ideal process (...) of intentional self-organization. Despite recognizing that Gestalt psychology develops fruitful models of perceptual self-organization, and adopting the transcendental view that form is significant for consciousness, his revisionary interpretation of form outstrips these accounts’ ontologies of mind and nature, and is better understood in light of a post-Kantian philosophical heritage. These results cast Merleau-Ponty’s relation to the Gestalt, post-Kantian, and phenomenological traditions in new light, challenge naturalizing interpretations of Structure, and motivate a rethinking of the status of metaphysics in his early thought. (shrink)

Since Husserl, the task of developing an account of intentionality and constitution has been central to the phenomenological enterprise. Some of Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of ‘the flesh’ suggest that he gives up on this task, or, more strongly, that the flesh is in principle incompatible with intentionality or constitution. I show that these remarks, as in Merleau-Ponty's earlier writings, refer to the classical, early Husserlian interpretations of these concepts, and argue that the concept of the flesh can plausibly be understood to (...) advance a refined account of intentionality and constitution. Instead of a first-personal, unidirectional act or embodied motor project, intentionality is a latent openness to things, where the roles of subject and object are reversible. Whereas the view of constitution as meaning-bestowal is untenable, the flesh has a constitutive role, which is supported by a ‘constitutional passivity’ from the subject. On this reading, Merleau-Ponty's later work aims to develop basic tenets of his earlier thought, albeit at a critical distance, an attempt he thought was continuous with the central problems that Husserl claimed a phenomenological philosophy must grapple with, even if Merleau-Ponty's answers to these problems are not Husserl's. (shrink)

Aron’s writings are lauded for their contributions to liberal political theory, international relations, and sociology. I argue that his early thought also offers phenomenological considerations for a relativist view of historical meaning, whose important role in the text’s argument has been suppressed by received interpretations. Drawing a direct link between introspective, intersubjective, and historical understanding, Aron argues that the “objectification” of intentions necessarily transforms their meaning. This impedes an objective account of historical subjects’ lived experience. Some of the Introduction’s appraisals (...) of historical understanding rely on Aron’s phenomenological observations, and indicate that the intentionality of historical understanding circumscribes claims to historical objectivity. These results highlight the broader implications of largely overlooked phenomenological commitments in Aron’s thought, offer a fresh interpretation of the Introduction, and suggest that the standard account of Aron’s relation to the phenomenological movement should be reconsidered. (shrink)

We can locate the problematic of time within three philosophical questions, which respectively designate three central areas of philosophical reflection and contemplation. These are: 1) The ontological question, i.e. 'what is being?' 2) The epistemological question, i.e. 'what can we know with certainty?' 3) The existential question, i.e. 'what is the meaning of existence?' These three questions, which are philosophical, but also scientific and political, as they underline the political and moral question of truth and justice, arise from the phenomenon (...) of time, the irreversible constant flow of phenomena that undermines every claim to absolute knowledge. The purpose of this essay is to illuminate the importance of time for philosophical thought and, more generally, for human social and psychical life, in the context of the ontology of Cornelius Castoriadis. Castoriadis, who asserted that " being is time – and not in the horizon of time " , correlated history to society and being to temporality within the social-historical stratum, the ontological plane created by human existence, where " existence is signification ". Time is interpreted as the creation and destruction of forms in a magmatic, layered with a non-regular stratification, reality, where the social-historical manifests as the creation of collective human activity, in the manner of social imaginary significations. This notion of temporality is accompanied by a profound criticism of traditional rationalistic philosophy, to which Castoriadis assigns the name 'ensemblistic/identitary', that highlights the necessity of a new, magmatic ontology, based on the primacy of time. (shrink)

«Τι να κάνουμε;» [Что делать?], ήταν ο τίτλος ενός πολιτικού φυλλαδίου που έγραψε ο Β. Ι. Λένιν το 1901 και κυκλοφόρησε το 1902 στη Ρωσία. Παρόλο τον ερωτηματικό χαρακτήρα του τίτλου, η απάντηση του Λένιν που αναπτυσσόταν στις σελίδες του κειμένου, έμελλε να τεθεί προστακτικά στο επαναστατικό κίνημα.

Everybody knows that Superman is Clark Kent. Nobody knows that Superman is Clark Kent. Located between these two absolute statements is the epistemological limit that separates the superhero fictitious universe from our universe of causal reality. The superheroic double identity is a secret shared by the superhero and the reader of the comic or the viewer of the movie, and quite often the superhero winks at the outside world, thus breaking the 4th wall and establishing this collusive relationship. However, in (...) our hypothesis, we are interested in Superman not as a fictitious archetype, but rather as a fictitious metaphor. We are not interested in his double identity as the matrix of superheroic attributes and narratives, but rather as the differential limit between superhuman and human within the fictional universe. Because, the reader or the viewer may share the secret identity with Superman and also with Spiderman or Batman or any other superhuman, but the secret equivalence of Superman and Clark Kent contains another hidden antithesis. (shrink)

The concept of time-travel is a modern idea which combines the imaginary signification of rational domination, the imaginary signification of technological omnipotence, the imaginary concept of eternity and the imaginary desire for immortality. It is a synthesis of central conceptual schemata of techno-science, such as the linearity and homogeneity of time, the radical separation of subjectivity from the world, the radical separation of the individual from his/her social-historical environment. The emergence of this idea, its spread during the 20th century as (...) a major theme of science fiction literature alongside its dissemination as a scientific hypothesis, its popularity with both the public and the scientific community, are indications of the religious role of techno-science. It is my opinion, finally, that, as a chimera, time-travel is non-feasible and impossible. In order to support my claims, I will briefly outline the origins of the time-travel concept and its epistemological and metaphysical/ontological conditions. If these conditions prove to be absurd, the logical impossibility of time-travel will have been demonstrated. (shrink)

Its preoccupation with ontology presents radical democracy with a thorny dilemma: how to combine commitment and affirmation with a distinctive emphasis on contingency and contestability. The article addresses this dilemma by engaging with three different perspectives. Ernesto Laclau’s work shows the intrinsic constraints of ontology and the inadequacy of a simple distinction between ontology and ethico-political decision. Simon Critchley opposes tying radical politics to ontological prefiguration and argues for a particular ethico-political orientation. But ethics and politics come entwined with ontological (...) assumptions, and the ethical direction of politics can be as restrictive as its ontological framing. William Connolly weds ontology and ethics to a sharp awareness of their contestability. But his approach does not reach deep enough. It is not alive to the contestability of the very recognition of contestability. To enhance openness and reflexivity, projects of radical democracy should combine a dimension of substantive, detailed accounts with a reflexive commitment to contestability, which disrupts, questions and renews the thicker descriptions in the name of democracy and truth. (shrink)

This paper attempts to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s later work by tracing a hitherto overlooked set of concerns that were of key consequence for the formulation of his ontological research. I argue that his ontology can be understood as a response to a set of problems originating in reflections on the intersubjective use of language in dialogue, undertaken in the early 1950s. His study of dialogue disclosed a structure of meaning-formation and pointed towards a theory of truth (both recurring ontological topics) that (...) post-Phenomenology premises could not account for. A study of dialogue shows that speakers’ positions are interchangeable, that speaking subjects are active and passive in varying degrees, and that the intentional roles of subjects and objects are liable to shift or ‘transgress’ themselves. These observations anticipate the concepts of ‘reversibility’ and ‘narcissism’, his later view of activity and passivity, and his later view of intentionality, and sharpened the need to adopt an intersubjective focus in ontological research. (shrink)

Cogitation described as calculation, the living being described as a machine, cognitive functions considered as algorithmic sequences and the ‘mechanization’ of the subjective were the theoretical elements that late heideggerian anti–humanism, especially in France was able to utilize[1], even more so, after the second cybernetics or post-cybernetics movement of the late ‘60s introduced the concepts of the autopoietic and the allopoietic automata[2]. Recently, neurologists pose claims on the traditional epistemological field of philosophy, proceeding from this ontological decision, the equation of (...) human cognition to cybernetic systems. -/- The emergence of the world-wide-web in the 1990s and the global expansion of the internet during the first decades of the 21st century indicate the fallacies of the cybernetics programme to mechanize the mind. We stand witnesses to a semantic colonization of the cybernetic system, a social imaginary creation and expansion within the digital ensemblistic – identitarian organization that cannot be described by mechanical or cybernetic terms. Paradoxically, cyberspace, as a new being, a form of alterity, seems to both exacerbate and capsize the polarization between the operational and the symbolic. The creation of the internet might be more than an epistemological revolution, to use the terminology of Thomas Kuhn. It might be an ontological revolution. -/- I will try to demonstrate that the emergence of the Internet refutes any such claims, since its context and utility can only be described by means of a social epistemology based on the understanding of social significances as continuous creations of an anonymous social imaginary proposed by Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997). I will try to explore some social-semantic aspects of the cyberspace as a nexus of social representations of the individual identity that forms a new sphere of being, where the subjective and the objective merge in a virtual subjective objectivity with unique epistemological attributes and possibilities. (shrink)

Alexandros Kioupkiolis re-conceptualises the common in tandem with the political. By engaging with key thinkers of community and the commons, including Nancy, Ostrom, Hardt and Negri, together with poststructuralist conceptions of agonism and hegemony from Mouffe and Laclau, he remedies problematic issues of power relations and division.

This article makes the case that Greece has witnessed a transition from a ‘post-democratic’ condition in the ’90 s and the early 21st century to a regime of ‘post-political biopower’ in 2010–12 that can bid democracy farewell. To adequately theorize this modality of power in a way pertinent to contemporary Greece, the paper takes its bearings from Agamben’s take on biopower, the homo sacer and the endless state of exception. But the analysis fills in Agamben’s theoretical skeleton by drawing on (...) Naomi Klein’s account of the ‘Shock Doctrine’, which captures a particular technique of biopower deployed by neoliberal hegemony, Deleuze’s insights about the ‘society of control’ and Lazzarato’s elaborations of these insights with reference to the ‘indebted man’, which can shed light on the political implications of the Greek debt crisis. Yet popular responses, initiatives and electoral politics, as well as the intricacies of dominant power relations, upset any monolithic and quasi-totalitarian account of sovereign rule, disclosing cracks, imbalances and dispersion in its edifice. (shrink)

This chapter reconstructs Dufrenne’s phenomenological interpretation of the aesthetic attitude. I argue that Dufrenne develops a fecund alternative to competing formulations, advances an innovative proposal for how artworks are perceived on their own terms, and undercuts the claim that a reliance on the subject-object frame- work in aesthetics entails a commitment to ‘subjectivism.’ On Dufrenne’s view, the aesthetic attitude is an intentional stance toward a special category of perceived object, which is defined by a ‘purposive’ mode of appearance. Whereas aesthetic (...) attitude theorists argue that a subjective ability to attend disinterestedly to objects is a sufficient condition for aesthetic experience, Dufrenne locates decisive condi- tions for aesthetic experience in the object-term. This innovative approach develops a novel take on the aesthetic attitude, blunts the edge of aesthetic anti-subjectivist arguments, advances an original interpretation of Kant’s relevance for phenomeno- logical aesthetics, and offers a plausible philosophical account of art’s objectivity and world-disclosive power. (shrink)

Αν υπάρχει κάτι ιδιαίτερο στη σχέση μεταξύ της Χάνα Άρεντ και του Μάρτιν Χάιντεγκερ, κάτι το σκανδαλώδες, είναι ακριβώς η σύζευξη, συμπλοκή και σύγκρουση δύο διαφορετικών χρονικών πεδίων: του δημόσιου χρόνου των δύο στοχαστών και του ερωτικού χρόνου των δύο εραστών. Μια σχέση που καθορίζεται από την απόφαση του Χάιντεγκερ να υποστηρίξει το ναζιστικό κόμμα. Μια απόφαση που τους χωρίζει και συνάμα τους ενώνει σε διαφορετικές όχθες της ίδιας τραγωδίας. Hannah Arendt: Ο ΜΑΡΤΙΝ ΧΑΙΝΤΕΓΚΕΡ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΟΓΔΟΝΤΑ ΧΡΟΝΩΝ Εκδότης: ΕΡΜΑ Χρονολογία (...) Έκδοσης Ιούνιος 2019 Αριθμός σελίδων 64 Διαστάσεις 18x13 Μετάφραση ΡΟΖΑΝΗΣ ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΣ. (shrink)

Ο σύγχρονος φιλοσοφικός στοχασμός δεν μπορεί να αποφύγει την αναμέτρηση με τη σκέψη του Μάρτιν Χάιντεγκερ και το πρόβλημα της στράτευσής του στον εθνικοσοσιαλισμό. Η πρόκληση που θέτει η επιλογή του διάσημου φιλοσόφου και η μετέπειτα σιωπή του σε σχέση με το σκάνδαλο αφορά, πέρα από τους στενούς κύκλους της πολιτικής και της φιλοσοφίας, και το ευρύτερο πεδίο της κοινωνικο-ιστορικής συνύπαρξης και ευθύνης. Είναι μία πρόκληση που δεν μπορούμε απλώς να παραβλέψουμε ή να προσπεράσουμε, ενώ το φάσμα της ακροδεξιάς δεν (...) έχει πάψει να συσκοτίζει το παρόν μας. Η στροφή του Κορνήλιου Καστοριάδη προς την ανθρώπινη ψυχή και την οντολογία του φαντασιακού, η κριτική του στην τεχνοεπιστήμη, η ενασχόλησή του με τη χρονικότητα και η ρήξη του με την παραδοσιακή λογική, τον φέρνουν σε πεδία όπου πέφτει βαριά η σκιά του Χάιντεγκερ. Ο τόμος Καστοριάδης εναντίον Χάιντεγκερ: Χρόνος και Ύπαρξη, που κυκλοφόρησε το 2020 από τις εκδόσεις Αυτολεξεί, ήταν μια συνοπτική παρουσίαση της αντιπαράθεσης της Χαϊντεγκεριανής σκέψης και της Καστοριαδικής φιλοσοφίας. -/- Η παρούσα εμπλουτισμένη και αναθεωρημένη έκδοση περιλαμ- βάνει, πέρα από την εκδίπλωση και ανάπτυξη των κεντρικών επι- χειρημάτων της προηγούμενης, και μία πιο λεπτομερή έκθεση των βασικών φιλοσοφικών θέσεων του Καστοριάδη σε σχέση με τον χρόνο, την ετερότητα και τα μάγματα, όπως και μία ενδεικτική εξέταση νέων διαστάσεων του κοινωνικο-ιστορικού, πάνω στις τρεις όψεις της ιστορικότητας, το παρελθόν, το παρόν και το μέλλον. Χρονολογία Έκδοσης Απρίλιος 2024 Αριθμός σελίδων 440 Διαστάσεις 21x14 ISBN: 978-618-84851-8-1. (shrink)

Τι είναι τα Κίτρινα Γιλέκα; Δεν μπορούμε εμείς, ως συντακτική της Βαβυλωνίας να μιλήσουμε εκ μέρους κάποιου κινήματος ενόσω ακόμη κινείται. Ούτε, βέβαια, μπορούμε να το αγνοήσουμε και να μην μιλήσουμε γι' αυτό. Χρειάζεται να αναστοχαστούμε αυτά τα κινήματα, να δούμε ποια είναι η σύνδεσή τους και η σημασία τους για εμάς. Σκοπός του παρόντος τόμου είναι να θέσει τη βάση αυτού του αναστοχασμού σε έναν διάλογο με τα κείμενα των ανθρώπων που ζουν αυτό το κίνημα, που μετέχουν σε αυτό, (...) που βιώνουν τη συλλογική πράξη που το αναδημιουργεί σε κάθε βήμα. Οι εξεγέρσεις του 21ου αιώνα δεν δίνουν απαντήσεις, αντίθετα φέρνουν στο φως τα πραγματικά ερωτήματα. Παρακολουθούμε τα Κίτρινα Γιλέκα όχι σαν θεατές ενός αγώνα από την κερκίδα, αλλά ως ενεργοί συνένοχοι στην προσπάθεια της κοινωνίας να απεγκλωβιστεί από το κράτος και το κεφάλαιο, να σπάσει τα δεσμά της. Συζητώντας για τα Κίτρινα Γιλέκα συζητάμε για το παρόν και το μέλλον μας. Και πριν μιλήσουμε, αυτή τη φορά, είναι σωστό πρώτα να ακούσουμε. (shrink)

We investigate experimentally the relationship between risk and incentives in a principal–agent setting. In contrast to the existing empirical literature that describes such relationship as ‘tenuous’ or inconclusive, we find a clear negative relationship—supporting the prediction of the standard theoretical model. Specifically, we find that principals reduce the size of the offered piece rates with an increase in risk and instead provide positive fixed wages. Furthermore, we find no relationship between the variance in the performance and the effort choice of (...) the agent, and a strong positive relationship between the effort choice of the agents and the offered piece rates as well as fixed wage, suggesting positive reciprocity. Finally, we find evidence of social projection by the principals regarding the agents’ degree of risk aversion. (shrink)

Hyppolite stresses his proximity to Merleau-Ponty, but the received interpretation of his “anti-humanist” reading of Hegel suggests a greater distance between their projects. This paper focuses on an under-explored dimension of their philosophical relationship. I argue that Merleau-Ponty and Hyppolite are both committed to formulating a mode of philosophical expression that can avoid the pitfalls of purely formal or literal and purely aesthetic or creative modes of expression. Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to navigate this dichotomy, I suggest, closely resembles Hyppolite’s interpretation of (...) Hegel’s “speculative” mode of expression. In particular, his emphasis on the “mediating” character of philosophical language, which moves between descriptive and creative expression, suggests a debt to Hyppolite. This reading provides more evidence to think that Hyppolite cannot be straightforwardly understood as an anti-humanist or post-phenomenological thinker, and paves the way for a _rapprochement_ between his work and the broader phenomenological tradition. (shrink)

O presente estudo objetivou analisar introdutoriamente a pós-graduação em Educação Física quanto à produção de conhecimento, desenvolvimento da inovação e seus impactos na prática pedagógica na escola. Abordando o tema descritivamente e criticamente, analisando dados do crescimento quantitativo e qualitativo da PGEF no Brasil, se discute inovação e aplicação de conhecimento na escola. Verifica-se o crescimento significativo tanto em número de programas, mestres e doutores bem como de artigos publicados em periódicos nacionais e internacionais. Embora o crescimento da PGEF esteja (...) ocorrendo, observam-se dificuldades na produção de inovação e de aplicação de conhecimento na escola. (shrink)

Changes in the abundance of protein and RNA molecules can impair the formation of complexes in the cell leading to toxicity and death. Here we exploit the information contained in protein, RNA and DNA interaction networks to provide a comprehensive view of the regulation layers controlling the concentration‐dependent formation of assemblies in the cell. We present the emerging concept that RNAs can act as scaffolds to promote the formation ribonucleoprotein complexes and coordinate the post‐transcriptional layer of gene regulation. We describe (...) the structural and interaction network properties that characterize the ability of protein and RNA molecules to interact and phase separate in liquid‐like compartments. Finally, we show that presence of structurally disordered regions in proteins correlate with the propensity to undergo liquid‐to‐solid phase transitions and cause human diseases. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/kfpqibsNfS0. (shrink)

Straddling the divide between universalism and relativism, agonistic reason as construed by Foucault and Castoriadis dismisses universal foundations without becoming context-bound or inescapably subjectivist. It is propelled by a strong commitment to freedom and it draws flexibly on available resources and its creative potentials in order to vindicate its conditional claims. This provides a hyper-critical and liberating mode of critical reason which delves into the underlying norms of agency in order to open them up to question and to enhance free (...) self-direction. The argument that is put forward, then, is threefold. Firstly, Castoriadis’ accent on ontological reflection, the imaginative disclosure of new figures and the global intent of critique contrasts with Foucault’s account of agonistic reason and yields a more robust version of critical rationality. Secondly, this form of reflective agonism can effectively address fundamental challenges and reason across contexts, tackling moral and other issues that arise from cultural innovation and exchange. Lastly, agonistic reason need not, and should not, call upon absolute principles on any level in order to uphold its own values and do justice to its radical others. (shrink)